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Abstract
Due to its convenience, biometric authentication, espe-
cial face authentication, has become increasingly main-
stream and thus is now a prime target for attackers. Pre-
sentation attacks and face morphing are typical types of
attack. Previous research has shown that finger-vein- and
fingerprint-based authentication methods are susceptible to
wolf attacks, in which a wolf sample matches many enrolled
user templates. In this work, we demonstrated that wolf
(generic) faces, which we call “master faces,” can also
compromise face recognition systems and that the master
face concept can be generalized in some cases. Motivated
by recent similar work in the fingerprint domain, we gener-
ated high-quality master faces by using the state-of-the-art
face generator StyleGAN in a process called latent variable
evolution. Experiments demonstrated that even attackers
with limited resources using only pre-trained models avail-
able on the Internet can initiate master face attacks. The
results, in addition to demonstrating performance from the
attacker’s point of view, can also be used to clarify and
improve the performance of face recognition systems and
harden face authentication systems.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in the development of biometric au-
thentication, especially in its ease of use, have enabled face
authentication (which uses face recognition) to be imple-
mented in many portable and handheld devices, from laptop
PCs to smartphones. Digital wallets, which are also called
“e-wallets” and are popular in many countries, also utilize
face authentication from the user’s smartphone to process
payments. As a result, face authentication systems have be-
come a prime target for attackers. Even before this trend,
interest in creating a face that matches multiple faces led
researchers to come up with the idea of face morphing [30],
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Figure 1. Example master faces generated with our method. Im-
ages in first and second column were generated using the MO-
BIO [21] and Labeled Faces in the Wild [19] databases, re-
spectively. Training for images in first row used Inception-
ResNet-v2 [33] based FR system trained on CASIA-WebFace
database [40] while that for ones in second row used same FR
system trained on MS-Celeb database [10].
which is a special case of image morphing [38]. Given two
or more faces from different identities, a system creates a
blended face that can match all component identities when
using face recognition (FR) systems and possibly fool a hu-
man observer. Morphing attacks often target automated bor-
der control systems, possibly by criminals to avoid being
detected [30].
Another kind of attack is called a “wolf attack,” which
targets biometric authentication systems by finding or craft-
ing a generic sample, a “wolf sample,” that has high sim-
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ilarity to many of the enrolled templates [36]. The advan-
tage of a wolf attack is that it does not require knowledge
about the enrolled subjects. Wolf attacks are commonly
aimed at finger-vein- and fingerprint-based recognition sys-
tems [36, 5]. Bontrager et al. introduced a generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) [7] based method for generating
realistic fingerprint images (“MasterPrints”) using the la-
tent variable evolution (LVE) strategy for use in attacking
systems using partial fingerprint images [5]. Although a de-
fense method was subsequently proposed [27], this kind of
attack has much room for improvement.
In this work, we demonstrated that wolf attacks can also
compromise FR systems. An LVE algorithm running on a
pre-trained high-quality face generator StyleGAN [15] was
able to match selected master face (wolf) samples with
multiple user templates (in-domain and out-of-domain) for
both known and unknown FR systems. A known FR system
is the one used on the running LVE algorithm while an un-
known FR system can be understood as one with the same
architecture but trained on a different database or one with
a completely different architecture. We modified the LVE
algorithm [5] by changing the way it calculates the scores
of the generated faces. The master faces can be easily and
quickly generated by simply using pre-trained models avail-
able on the Internet. Examples are shown in Figure 1.
We used a combination of a StyleGAN model pre-
trained on the Flickr-Faces-HQ (FFHQ) database [15] and
an Inception-ResNet-v2 [33] based FR system pre-trained
by de Freitas Pereira et al. [6] on the CASIA-WebFace
database [40] (available in Bob toolbox [1]) to generate the
master faces. With this combination and less than 24 hours
of training on a conventional personal computer (PC) with-
out a graphics processing unit (GPU), we generated mas-
ter faces that achieved false acceptance rates (FARs) be-
tween 6 and 35% depending on the test database and tar-
geted FR system. These high rates raise a major concern
about the ability of FR systems to deal with a master face
attack, which can be launched by someone without any spe-
cial training. In addition to considering the attacker’s point
of view, we also consider countermeasures to mitigate this
threat.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we
present general information about facial image generation,
FR systems, wolf attacks, and the LVE algorithm in sec-
tion 2. We then introduce our proposed method in section 3
and describe our experimental design, present the results,
and discuss them in section 4. Next, we discuss possible
ways in the literature to defend against master face attacks
in section 5. Finally, we summarize the key points and men-
tion future work in section 6.
2. Related Work
2.1. Facial Image Generation
Facial image generation has recently been attracting the
attention of the research community, especially since the
introduction of variational autoencoders (VAEs) [18] and
GANs [7]. Initially, only facial images with low resolu-
tion and sizes were generated. In addition, VAEs suffer a
trade-off between disentangled representations and recon-
struction errors while GANs are difficult to train. To solve
the later problem, Arjovsky et al. proposed the Wasser-
stein GAN (WGAN), which improves the stability of learn-
ing and eliminates the mode collapse problem [2]. Subse-
quent work led to an improved WGAN called WGAN-GP
in which the weight clipping is replaced with a gradient-
based penalty function [9]. WGAN [2, 9] was used in the
work of Bontrager et al. to generate master prints for use in
attacking partial fingerprint authentication systems [5].
Despite these improvements, GANs still suffer the prob-
lem of generating high-resolution images. Karras et al. pro-
posed a training methodology in which both the generator
and discriminator are progressively trained [14]. It starts
with a low-resolution image model and then repeatedly adds
new layers to the model to incorporate fine details. Us-
ing this idea of progressive training and borrowing the idea
of image generating from the style transfer field, Karras et
al. introduced a novel face generator network called Style-
GAN [15]. This network has the ability to automatically
learn and separate high-level attributes (such as pose and
identity) and stochastic variation in the generated images
(such as freckles and hair). Unlike traditional GANs, Style-
GAN includes two components: a mapping network that
maps the input latent vector to intermediate style vectors
and feeds them into the synthesis network. With these two
components, StyleGAN handles disentanglement well and
supports style mixing. Subsequent work focused on ana-
lyzing and improving the quality of StyleGAN generated
imags [16]. In this work, we used StyleGAN [15] for facial
image generation.
2.2. Face Recognition Systems
Recent advances in convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) and the releases of large annotated databases sub-
stantially improved the performances of FR systems, en-
abling them to be applied to not only homogeneous but also
heterogeneous domains [6]. Two examples of such large
databases are the CASIA-WebFace database [40] and the
MS-Celeb database [10], which are commonly used to cre-
ate training data for state-of-the-art FR systems. Smaller
well-known databases that had been previously released,
like the MOBIO database [21] and the Labeled Faces in
the Wild (LFW) database [19], are usually used for val-
idation. Reusing an architecture that performed well in
the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
(ILSVRC) [28] as a feature extractor for CNN-based FR
systems, rather than designing a new architecture from
scratch, is a commonly used approach. The two most com-
monly used architectures are the VGG (Visual Geometry
Group) network [32] and the Inception network [33].
Parkhi et al. adopted the VGG-16 network [32] for an FR
task (“VGG-Face”) and trained it on a custom-built large-
scale database [25]. Wu et al. introduced a light CNN that
uses max-feature-map activation and has ten times fewer
parameters than the VGG-Face network [39]. The Incep-
tion architecture [33] was used by Schroff et al. to build
the FaceNet model, which maps facial images to a compact
Euclidean space embedding [31]. Therefore, it can be used
for face verification, recognition, and clustering. The closet
open-source implementation of FaceNet was done by David
Sandberg [29] using the Inception-ResNet v1 and v2 archi-
tectures [33]. Additionally, de Freitas Pereira et al. used the
Inception-ResNet v2 architecture in their heterogeneous FR
work [6]. Experiments demonstrated that Inception-based
methods perform better than VGG-based ones. Using an-
other approach, Tran et al. proposed a disentangled repre-
sentation learning GAN method (“DR-GAN”) that can deal
with face variations, especially in pose [35]. In our exper-
iments, we used three FR systems: (1) Inception-ResNet
v1 based FaceNet by David Sandberg [29], (2) Inception-
ResNet v2 network by de Freitas Pereira et al. [6], and (3)
DR-GAN by Tran. et al. [35].
2.3. Wolf Attacks
For biometric authentication systems, Une et al. [36] de-
fined a “wolf sample” as an input sample that can be falsely
accepted as a match with multiple user templates (enrolled
subjects). They also defined a measurement called wolf at-
tack probability (WAP), which is the maximum probability
of a successful attack with one wolf sample. Wolf attacks
and defenses against them are the subject of much research
in the finger-vein and fingerprint recognition fields. Wolf
attacks has been evolved from generating forged minu-
tiae [26] to generating real partial fingerprint images [5].
In the latest work [5], Bontrager et al. used a latent variable
evolution algorithm to maximize the WAPs of partial fin-
gerprint images generated by a GAN. This type of attack is
applicable to systems using small-size sensors with limited
resolution. In contrast, in this work, we focused on gener-
ating high-quality high-resolution facial images for use in
attacking FR systems using full-face input.
2.4. Latent Variable Evolution Algorithm
Inspired by biological evolution, evolution algorithms
have long been used in artificial intelligence applications
without any assumption about the underlying fitness land-
scape. One such algorithm is the evolution strategies (ES)
algorithm, which can be used for complex, multimodal,
and non-differentiable functions. Proposed by Hansen and
Ostermeier, the Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution
Strategy (CMA-ES) is a powerful ES algorithm designed
for non-linear and non-convex functions [12]. Bontrager
et al. demonstrated that interactive evolutionary computa-
tion can be used in combination with a GAN [4]. After the
GAN is trained, a latent vector used as input to the GAN
can be put under evolutionary control, resulting in the gen-
eration of high-quality samples. Bontrager et al. proposed
combining this method with the CMA-ES algorithm [12] to
generate partial fingerprints. The resulting LVE algorithm
maximizes the WAP of the generated partial fingerprint im-
ages against a fingerprint authentication system [5]. Fol-
lowing this success in the fingerprint domain, we modified
the scoring method used for the LVE algorithm and applied
the resulting algorithm to the facial domain, which is trick-
ier since human vision is more sensitive to faces than fin-
gerprints. With the help of the StyleGAN high-quality face
generator [15] and the powerful CMA-ES algorithm [12],
our proposed method can generate high-resolution master
faces that are both natural looking and have a high WAP.
3. Proposed Method
3.1. Overview
Style-
GAN
Enrolled
subjects
Face
recognition
sytem
ScoresCMA-ES
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Figure 2. Overview of proposed method. With default setting,
22 latent vectors with a dimensionality of 512 are fed into Style-
GAN [15] to generate 22 facial images. The surrogate FR system
then calculates mean score for each image on basis of enrolled
subjects. CMA-ES [12] algorithm then uses scores to estimate 22
new latent vectors.
An overview of the proposed method is shown in Fig-
ure 2. In addition to the LVE algorithm, we need a pre-
trained face generator (in this case, StyleGAN [15]), a sur-
rogate pre-trained FR system (used to approximate the tar-
get FR system), a surrogate face database, and an imple-
mentation of the CMA-ES algorithm [12]. If a pre-trained
generator is not available, one must be trained from scratch:
• Prepare three or four face databases: one to train Style-
GAN, one or two to train the FR system (in the case
of two, one is used for validation), and one to run
the LVE algorithm. Some or all of them could over-
lap; in our work, we used the hardest case, i.e., non-
overlapping, to demonstrate the generalizability of our
proposed method.
• Prepare and train FR system.
• Prepare and train StyleGAN.
• Implement or use open-source library for CMA-ES al-
gorithm, e.g., pycma [11].
• Run LVE algorithm.
3.2. Latent Variable Evolution
Algorithm 1 Latent variable evolution.
m← 22 . Population size
procedure RUNLVE(m,n)
MasterFaces = {} . Master face set
MasterScores = {} . and the corresponding score set
z← 0 . Initialize latent vectors z ∈ Rm
for n iterations do . Run LVE algorithm n times
F ← StyleGAN(z) . Generate m faces F
s← 0 . Initialize scores s ∈ Rm
for face Fi in faces F do
for face Ej in data E do
si ← si+ FaceMatching(Fi, Ej)
s← s|E| . Calculate the mean scores
Fb, sb ← GetBestFace(F, s)
MasterFaces.append(Fb)
MasterScores.append(sb)
z ← CMA ES(s) . Evolve z based on s
return MasterFaces, MasterScores
Fb, sb ← GetBestFace(MasterFaces, MasterScores)
The LVE procedure is formalized in Algorithm 1. The
FaceMatching(Fi, Ej) function calculate the similarity be-
tween two input faces Fi and Ej . As the default setting for
the CMA-ES library [11], we set population size m to 22.
Unlike the algorithm of Bontrager et al. [5], our algorithm
does not require information about the pre-defined false
matching rate (FMR). Moreover, the accumulated match-
ing scores s are not added in a binary way (matched or
unmatched: FaceMatching(·, ·) function only returns 1 or
0, respectively) but instead by using the actual similarity
scores calculated by the FR system. As a result, the CMA-
ES algorithm tries to maximize the s in each iteration.
Therefore, the optimization curve is smoother than that of
the Bontrager’s LVE algorithm, especially when the training
data for StyleGAN, the FR system, and this LVE algorithm
(E) differ. One example is that, if there are no matches, the
accumulated score si of each generated face Fi is 0 with
the Bontrager’s algorithm, whereas the CMA-ES algorithm
has no clue to use in evolving z. This problem is solved by
using the actual scores for s.
The local best master face Fb is selected among m mas-
ter faces and collected after each iteration on the basis of
its score sb, which is also logged. After n iterations, the
final (global) best master face is chosen among n best mas-
ter faces on the basis of the logged scores. The reason we
do this instead of selecting the best master face of all mas-
ter faces in every iteration is that (1) it reduces the storage
of master faces and (2), if the number of iterations is large
enough, besides getting better, themmaster faces generated
in each iteration get closer to each other (by identity, appear-
ance, background, and pose). Therefore, selecting the best
one among them is sufficient. The running of the LVE algo-
rithm on two databases based on the FMR and t-distributed
stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) visualization [20]
of the master faces at certain iterations is described in sec-
tion 4.2.
4. Evaluation
In this section, we first describe our experimental de-
sign, including the FR systems and databases we used (sec-
tion 4.1). We then describe the running of the proposed
LVE algorithm on the LFW - Fold 1 database (scenario 1)
and MOBIO database (scenario 2) and the analysis of its be-
havior (section 4.2). Finally, we describe the calculation of
the attack success probabilities of the obtained master faces
for both scenario 1 (section 4.3) and 2 (section 4.4).
4.1. Experimental Design
4.1.1 Face Recognition Systems
We used four pre-trained FR systems supported by the Bob
toolbox [1]:
• Inception-ResNet-v2 [33] based FR systems trained by
de Freitas Pereira et al. [6]: one trained on the CASIA-
WebFace database [40] and one trained on the MS-
Celeb database [10]. We used the one trained on
the CASIA-WebFace database to run the LVE al-
gorithm.
• FaceNet (using the Inception-v1 architecture [34])
proposed by Schroff et al. [31], implemented and
trained by David Sandberg [29] on the MS-Celeb
database [10].
• DR-GAN proposed and implemented by Tran et
al. [35], pre-trained on a combination of the Multi-PIE
database [8] and the CASIA-WebFace database [40].
4.1.2 Databases
Beside the databases used to train the FR systems men-
tioned above (CASIA-WebFace [40], MS-Celeb [10],
and Multi-PIE [8]), we used the MOBIO database [21]
with both male and female components and the LFW
database [19] aligned by funneling [13] to run the LVE algo-
rithm and validate the master faces. The LFW database has
several protocols; we used the fold 1 protocol. The MOBIO
and LFW - Fold 1 databases were divided into two mutually
exclusive sets (with non-overlapping identities): a world
set used for training and a development (dev) set used for
threshold selection for the FR systems (based on the equal
error rate, EER), and an evaluation (eval) set. The dev and
eval sets were both used to evaluate the master faces. In
the dev and eval sets, the test pairs included both genuine
and zero-effort imposter cases. To test the master faces, we
replaced the test pairs by matching the master faces with
all enrolled subjects and measured the false matching rates
(FMRs).
The StyleGAN face generator was pre-trained on the
Flickr-Faces-HQ (FFHQ) database [15]. For this training,
there were no overlaps between the databases used for train-
ing the FR systems, training StyleGAN, and running the
LVE algorithm. We wanted to demonstrate the generaliz-
ability of our proposed method since attackers often lack
the knowledge and resources needed to perform this kind of
attack and therefore tend to use resources widely available
on the Internet.
4.2. Running Latent Variable Evolution
Figure 3. FMR for Inception-ResNet-v2 based FR system [33]
when running LVE algorithm on LFW - Fold 1 database [19] and
MOBIO database [21].
We ran the LVE algorithm on two databases (LFW - Fold
1 [19] - scenario 1 and MOBIO [21] - scenario 2) with the
Inception-ResNet-v2 based FR system [33] trained on the
CASIA-WebFace database [40]. We ran it on a PC without a
Begin
EndBest
Figure 4. T-SNE visualization of master faces obtained every 20
iterations (1000 in total) on LFW - Fold 1 database [19]. Green
dot represents master face at beginning; it is connected by dashed
lines with intermediate master faces (black dots) that end at blue
dot. Red dot represents best master face, created at 989 th iteration;
therefore, it does not overlap any black dot.
GPU for only 1000 iterations, which took less than 24 hours
per database. The FMRs for the two databases are plotted
in Figure 3. Since the MOBIO database has high variabil-
ity in the pose and illumination conditions compared with
the LFW - Fold 1 database, which greatly affected the FR
system (the selected threshold was trickier), the FMRs for
the MOBIO database were lower than those for the LFW
database. They were about 35% for the LFW - Fold 1
database and 30% for the MOBIO database at the 1000th
iteration. Nevertheless, both curves still tend to increase.
We limited the number of iterations to demonstrate that the
attack can be done in a limited time. Comprehensive analy-
sis will be done in follow-up work.
T-SNE visualization [20] of the process of running the
LVE algorithm on the LFW - Fold 1 database is shown in
Figure 4. Initially, the CMA-ES algorithm was unsure about
the optimal direction. After finding some clues, it began
generating master faces that jumped around the best master
face (the red dot) and came closer and closer to it.
4.3. Scenario 1: LFW - Fold 1 Database
In this scenario, we ran the LVE algorithm on the LFW
- Fold 1 database [19] using the Inception-ResNet-v2 based
FR system [33]. The best master face is shown in Figure 1
(top right). We then tested it using three FR systems with
four configurations on the LFW - Fold 1 database [19] and
the MOBIO database [21]. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 5 and summarized in Table 1.
We tried to match the obtained master face with all en-
rolled faces in the dev and eval sets of the LFW - Fold 1
database. A score histogram for the master face is plotted
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Figure 5. FMRs of original test designs and of master face generated using LFW - Fold 1 database [19] calculated using four configurations
of three FR systems on LFW - Fold 1 database [19] and MOBIO database [21].
Figure 6. Histogram of scores for genuine faces, zero-effort im-
poster faces, and master face generated using LFW - Fold 1
database [19] calculated using Inception-ResNet-v2 based FR sys-
tem [33].
in Figure 6 along with those for the genuine faces and the
zero-effort imposter faces from the original test design of
the database. The master face scores moved away from the
zero-effort imposter scores in the direction of the genuine
face scores with about 3035% overlap. This means that the
master face matched 3035% of the enrolled faces, which is
significant.
As shown in Figure 5, the wolf attack worked on two
FR systems on the LFW - Fold 1 database: the Inception-
ResNet-v2 based one trained on the CASIA-WebFace
database (which was also used to train the master face) and
the DR-GAN one trained on a combination of the CASIA-
WebFace and Multi-PIE databases. The results for the DR-
GAN FR system demonstrate that the proposed method is
generalizable to other FR system architectures. The wolf
attack did not work in two cases:
• LFW - Fold 1 database: The Inception-ResNet-v2 and
Inception-v1 based FR systems were trained on the
MS-Celeb database. Since the MS-Celeb database is
larger than the CASIA-WebFace one, the FR systems
trained on it were more robust than the others, which
can be observed from the FMRs for the normal test
cases without master faces. Since the master face was
trained using the FR system trained on the CASIA-
WebFace database, it was not strong enough to work
on the normal cases.
• MOBIO database: As we mentioned above, the MO-
BIO database has high variability in the pose and illu-
mination conditions compared with the LFW - Fold
1 database; therefore, the master face generated us-
ing the LFW - Fold 1 database was not sophisticated
enough to work with the MOBIO database.
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Figure 7. FMRs of original test designs and of master face generated using MOBIO database [21] calculated using four configurations of
three FR systems on MOBIO database [21] and LFW - Fold 1 database [19].
FR Setting Scenario 1 Scenario 2Known DB Unknown DB Known DB Unknown DB
Same Arch. - Same DB 1 0 1 1
Same Arch. - Different DB 0 0 0 0
Different Arch. - Same DB 1 0 0 0
Different Arch. - Different DB 0 0 0 0
Table 1. Summary of successful attacks for scenarios 1 and 2 with different FR system settings (including their architecture and database
used to train them) and databases.
4.4. Scenario 2: MOBIO Database
In this scenario, we ran the LVE algorithm on the MO-
BIO database [21] using the Inception-ResNet-v2 based FR
system [33]. The best master face is shown in Figure 1
(top left). As in the previous scenario, we tested it using
three FR systems with four configuration on the MOBIO
database [21] and the LFW - Fold 1 database [19]. The re-
sults are shown in Figure 7 and are summarized in Table 1.
The wolf attack worked on the Inception-ResNet-v2
based FR system trained on the CASIA-WebFace database
(which was also used to train the master face) on both the
MOBIO and LFW - Fold 1 databases. The FMRs were
about 1220% on the MOBIO database and 7%12% on the
LFW - Fold 1 database. These results demonstrate that
the proposed method is generalizable to different databases.
This is because the MOBIO database is more sophisticated
than the LFW - Fold 1 database. Unfortunately, it did not
work on the other FR systems. One possible explanation
is that since the MOBIO database is sophisticated, the LVE
algorithm was trying to “overfit” the used FR system with
master faces that were uncommon to other FR systems to
increase the FMRs.
Two examples of all faces matched are shown in Fig-
ure 8 (eval set for MOBIO database) and Figure 9 (dev set
for LFW - Fold 1 database). The images were sorted from
nearest to furthest. The master face matched both male and
female subjects of different races with different skin tones,
poses, and illumination, with or without beard, glasses, hat,
and scarf. The master face was trained on the MOBIO
database, which has many selfie-like photos; therefore, it
also had an appearance of a selfie photo.
In addition to helping us understand the attacker’s
point of view, the obtained results can be used to iden-
tify the weaknesses of an FR system. For example,
the Inception-ResNet-v2 based FR system trained on the
CASIA-WebFace database has two weaknesses: it has trou-
ble distinguishing between male and female and under-
standing racial differences. Another example comes from
Fig 1 shown in section 1. The Inception-ResNet-v2 based
FR system trained on the MS-Celeb database seems to be
poor at recognizing images of children as two of the mas-
ter faces are of children. One possible explanation is that
the MS-Celeb database lacks photographs of children since
most celebrities are teenagers or adults.
Figure 8. Master face (bordered in red) and all matching en-
rolled faces sorted from nearest to furthest for eval set of MOBIO
database [21].
Figure 9. Master face (bordered in red) and all matching enrolled
faces sorted from nearest to furthest for dev set of LFW - Fold 1
database [19].
5. Defense Against Master Face Attack
To prevent such kinds of attack, besides improving FR
systems, we need to use an additional detector to filter out
master faces. For camera-based FR and face authentica-
tion systems, using a presentation attack detector [3] is a
good option. If the system takes a digital image as in-
put, a computer-generated/manipulated image detector [37]
is needed. However, the generalizability of such detectors
is a major concern [17], especially when the master faces
were generated using databases that have a different dis-
tribution from those covered by the detectors. Although
recent work has addressed this problem, performance on
cross-databases is still limited [24, 22, 23] and needs fur-
ther improvement.
6. Summary and Future Work
Aimed at simplicity by using available resources eas-
ily obtained on the Internet, including a pre-trained Style-
GAN model, a pre-trained face recognition system, a face
database, and a conventional PC without a GPU, our pro-
posed method can generate master faces in less than a day.
Beside the ability to attack seen data and seen face recogni-
tion systems (white box attacks), the master faces, in some
cases, can be generalized. This discovery raises concerns
about the robustness of face recognition and face authenti-
cation systems. Moreover, the properties of the master faces
can provide clues for understanding and improving FR sys-
tems. Although countermeasures can be used to mitigate
this type of attack, further research is needed to make face
authentication systems more secure, especially when they
are used in applications related to finance and personal data.
Future work will mainly focus on deep analysis of the
properties of the master faces, mostly about the correlation
between the skin color, race, gender, age, and pose of the
master face and their proportion in the data used for running
LVE. Another important task is to perform more experi-
ments on more face recognition systems and more databases
and to improve the generalizability of the master faces on
them. One possible solution for the generalizability is using
multiple surrogate face recognition systems for LVE. The
recently released StyleGAN 2 [16] will be used instead of
the previous version to improve the quality of the generated
images.
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